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OBSTACLES TO FEED-IN TARIFFS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the shadow of the established threat posed by climate 
change, the United States and other modernized nations 
require renewable energy resources both to satisfy an ever-
increasing demand for energy and to combat energy-related 
environmental dangers. 1 Yet, in the United States, a time-
tested solution for promoting renewable energy resources is 
threatened by out-of-date law. That solution is the Feed-In 
Tariff (FIT), and the threat consists of federal legislation and 
court decisions that effectively prohibit states from 
implementing FITs. A FIT is a mechanism for promoting 
renewable energy, such as that created by solar arrays and 
wind farms. A FIT helps create a stable, profitable market for 
renewable-energy investment by guaranteeing that renewable-
energy generators have connectivity to the greater electrical 
grid and receive a price for their energy that makes their 
business profitable. Federal law, however, preempts states 
from implementing FITs. 
1 See, e.g., Stephanie B. Ohshita, Ph.D., The Scientific and International 
Context for Climate Change Initiatives, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 1-10 (2007) (explaining the 
impacts and risks of global warming); see also Frank Princiotta, The Role of Power 
Generation Technology in Mitigating Global Climate Change, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
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In the United States, the FIT's future is threatened by 
decades-old legislation, regulation, and court decisions that 
were' appropriate for their time but have not kept pace with 
contemporary energy needs. Central to this threat is the 
concept of federal preemption of state jurisdiction over the 
transmission and sale of electrical energy. States, learning 
from the experiences of countries that have successfully 
implemented FITs, have begun to implement FITs of their own 
across the United States.2 In the face of antiquated law, 
however, any FIT that a state creates will not withstand a 
challenge before the United States Supreme Court. This 
Comment proposes a jurisdictional carve-out that will grant 
states sufficient jurisdiction to reliably implement FITs. 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief survey of the 
current rules that delineate federal and state jurisdiction over 
electrical energy in the United States. Part II also discusses 
three important exceptions to these jurisdictional rules. This 
Comment· then examines the FIT in the scheme of federal 
versus state jurisdiction. Part III discusses the value of the 
FIT and then analyzes the development of current 
jurisdictional rules that make state-law FITs untenable in the 
current legal landscape. Finally, Part IV proposes a solution in 
the form of a jurisdictional carve-out modeled on the Rural 
Electrification Act, an initiative that the federal government 
launched to promote energy development. 
II. OVERVIEW: THE RULES OF JURISDICTION OVER THE 
TRANSMISSION AND SALE OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
In the United States, jurisdiction over the regulation of 
electrical energy defaults to the states, except where Congress 
expressly reserves jurisdiction for the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC).3 FERC regulates the services 
and rates of facilities that enter electrical energy into 
2 E.g., Gainesville, Fla., Ordinance 080566 (Feb. 5, 2009), available at 
http://www.gru.comIPdflAboutGRUlNewsIFIT/2009%20FIT%200rdinance%20CLEAN. 
pdf (introducing FIT legislation); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY & THE STATE 
OF HAWAII, FEED-IN TARIFF CASE STUDIES: A WmTE PAPER IN SUPPORT OF THE HAWAII 
CLEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE 37-39, (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.wind-
works.orgIFeedLawslUSAlhawaiijeedin_tariff_case_studies.pdf. 
316 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009). 
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interstate commerce.4 This section first explains the 
circumstances that warrant federal jurisdiction under FERC. 
It then discusses remaining state jurisdiction over electrical 
energy. Lastly, this section examines key exceptions to the 
rules of federal and state jurisdiction to demonstrate that even 
established jurisdiction over electrical energy is not absolute. 
A. FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER ELECTRICAL ENERGY 
The Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA)5 and the 
Federal Power Act (FPA)6 determine federal jurisdiction over 
energy transmissions and transactions. These acts created 
FERC and authorized FERC to regulate those areas of the 
energy market that are subject to federal jurisdiction. 7 FERC 
has two jurisdictional "hooks," or legal justifications, that it can 
invoke to assert jurisdiction over a legal matter.s One hook 
considers the transmission of energy, and the other considers 
the sale of energy.9 
FERC has jurisdiction over all facilities that transmit 
electrical energy in interstate commerce. 10 A facility has 
transmitted electrical energy in interstate commerce if that 
energy has been subsequently consumed - meaning used and 
not resold - in another state. ll This definition is significant 
because it does not require that a certain quantity or 
percentage of a facility's energy be consumed in another state.12 
Under this language, if one facility transmits just a single 
electron to another state, where a retail customer consumes it, 
and a second facility transmits all of its energy production to 
another state for retail consumption, both facilities fall entirely 
under FERC jurisdiction.13 
'16 U.S.C.A. § 813 (Westlaw 2009). 
"16 U.S.C.A. § 2601 et seq. (Westlaw 2009). 
616 U.S.C.A. § 792 et seq. (Westlaw 2009). 
716 U.s.C.A. §§ 792 et seq., 2601 et seq. (Westlaw 2009). Technically, the FPA 
created the Federal Power Commission (FPC), but the FPC was later abolished and its 
relevant powers transferred to FERC under the Department of Energy Organization 
Act. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7101 et seq. (Westlaw 2009). 
B 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
II 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(c) (Westlaw 2009). 
12 Id. 
13 16 U.S.C.A. § 813 (Westlaw 2009); see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(c) (Westlaw 
3
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FERC also has jurisdiction over facilities that sell 
electricity, at wholesale, in interstate commerce. 14 A sale "at 
wholesale" occurs when one party sells electricity to any other 
party for the purpose of subsequent resale. 15 The definition of a 
sale of electricity in interstate commerce is more elusive, 
however, because though federal law defines the transmission 
of electrical energy in interstate commerce, the law neglects to 
expressly define the sale of electricity in interstate commerce.16 
Whether a sale is "in interstate commerce" depends upon 
the generating facility's connection to the greater electrical 
grid. Electrical energy is transmitted in interstate commerce 
when it is transmitted from a state and consumed outside the 
state.17 This does not explain whether a sale from a generator 
to a reseller qualifies as "interstate" or "intrastate" because, in 
such a transaction, there is no immediately apparent 
consumer. IS Without an identifiable consumer, regulators 
cannot determine if a transaction occurred intrastate or 
interstate. 19 Thus, FERC cannot assert jurisdiction until it 
makes this determination.20 
Certain energy transactions, however, have already been 
evaluated for jurisdiction, resulting in a sweeping grant of 
jurisdiction to FERC.21 A sale of electrical energy from a seller 
in one state to a buyer (whether reseller or consumer) in 
another state unquestionably triggers FERC jurisdiction. 22 
FERC also has jurisdiction over a facility that sells electrical 
energy to another in-state company where that energy 
definitely arrives at a third party who is out of the state 
2009); cf. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 471 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that mere interconnection to the grid invokes federal 
jurisdiction). 
,. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009). 
15 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(d) (Westlaw 2009). 
,. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(c) (Westlaw 2009) (defining "in interstate commerce" with 
regard to the transmission of electrical energy but neglecting to expressly define "in 
interstate commerce" with regard to the wholesale sale of electrical energy). 
17 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(c) (Westlaw 2009). 
18 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 824 (Westlaw 2009). 
19 Seeid. 
2!l See 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b) (Westlaw 2009). 
21 See Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 458 (1972) (citing United States v. 
Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 311 (1953); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power 
Co='n, 324 U.S. 515 (1945); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 
U.S. 83 (1927)). 
22 Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 458. 
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(regardless of whether the energy is consumed by that third 
party).23 Additionally, FERC can assert jurisdiction over a 
facility when evidence merely supports FERC's contention that 
the facility's energy is ultimately consumed in another state, 
even when FERC is unable to conclusively determine whether 
an out-of-state consumer does, indeed, consume that energy.24 
Under this rule, Seller X can sell electrical energy intrastate to 
Reseller Y, and as long as evidence indicates that some of this 
electrical energy may reach an out-of-state entity, Seller X is 
subject to FERC jurisdiction. 25 
B. STATE JURISDICTION OVER ELECTRICAL ENERGY 
Authority to regulate the energy industry defaults to the 
states if Congress has not granted regulation of a particular 
segment of the energy industry to FERC.26 Since FERC has 
jurisdiction over interstate sale and transmission of electrical 
energy, states primarily regulate the retail sale of electrical 
energy to consumers.27 To fulfill this role, states have 
jurisdiction over distribution systems, which are facilities that 
provide retail energy sales to consumers within the state.28 
State law, however, is not limited to regulation of retail-
oriented distribution systems, but rather applies by default 
whenever FERC lacks jurisdiction. 29 
C. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULES OF FEDERAL AND STATE 
JURISDICTION OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY 
Though the boundaries of FERC jurisdiction may seem 
simple, this simplicity is misleading. The division between 
federal and state jurisdiction over electrical energy is not as 
clear as the statutory language might imply, nor is it absolute. 
This section demonstrates some of the flexibility and 
23 [d. at 458, 463. 
24 [d. at 469 (stating that the Court would not disturb the Commission's 
conclusions that were substantially supported by expert opinion, and adding that it 
was impossible for the Commission to prove that out-of-state energy reached wholesale 
customers). 
25 Seeid. 
26 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009). 
TI See 16 U.S.C.A. § 796(15) (Westlaw 2009). 
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complexity of the rules of jurisdiction over electrical energy 
transactions. 
1. The "Dual Use" Exception 
Interconnections to distribution systems are usually 
subject to state jurisdiction, but FERC can assert jurisdiction 
over distribution systems when those systems are "dual use.,,30 
An "interconnection" consists of a physical pathway for 
electrical energy plus the agreements between parties with 
regard to the flow of electricity over the pathway.31 A 
distribution system is "dual use" when it engages in both 
interstate energy transactions and local distribution of 
energy.32 FERC can assert jurisdiction over interconnections to 
a dual-use distribution facility only when the facility is 
included in a public utility's open access transmission tariff 
(OATT).33 When a public utility company falls under FERC 
jurisdiction because it transmits electrical energy in interstate 
commerce, FERC requires the public utility company to post an 
OATT.34 This tariff is the rate35 that the public utility company 
must charge all market participants that pay for access to and 
use of facilities that the public utility company owns or 
operates.36 Without OATTs, a public utility company would be 
able to manipulate the market by charging favored participants 
a lower rate than other participants.37 OATTs level the playing 
30 See Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and 
Procedures, 104 F.E.R.C. 'll 61,103 at para. 804 (2003); see also Nat'l Ass'n of 
Regulatory UtiI. Comm'rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
31 Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory UtiI. Comm'rs v. FERC, 475 F.3d 1277, 1280 (D.C. 
Cir.2007). 
32 See Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and 
Procedures, 104 F.E.R.C. 'll 61,103 at para. 804 (2003); see also Nat'l Assil of 
Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 475 F.3d at 1282. 
33 The National Association of Regulatory Commissioners argued that FERC 
violates its jurisdiction by exercising authority over dual-use facilities, but the D.C. 
Circuit rebuffed this argument, so federal jurisdiction of dual-use distribution systems 
is an inescapable consideration for power providers. Nat'l Assil of Regulatory Util. 
Comm'rs, 475 F.3d at 1281-82. If the court had held otherwise, public utility 
companies would now have an incentive to dodge federal jurisdiction simply by using 
dual-use facilities. Id. at 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
34 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (Westlaw 2009). 
3S The rate is in dollars per unit of energy, such as dollars per kW-month. See, 
e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. FERC, 210 F.3d 403, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
36 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (Westlaw 2009). 
37 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 533 F.3d 820, 822 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also 
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field among energy-industry participants.3s When a public 
utility company operates, even in part, a facility that is also a 
local distribution system, interconnections to that facility can 
be included in the public utility's OATT and thus can be 
regulated by FERC.39 This is true even though the distribution 
system is normally subject to state jurisdiction.40 
2. The QualifYing Facility Exception: The "PURPA Sale" 
FERC can delegate its regulatory authority to the states in 
certain circumstances.41 The FPA permits an energy-producing 
facility that meets certain criteria 42 to register as a "qualifying 
facility" (QF).43 PURPA authorizes states, rather than FERC, 
to regulate sales of energy from QFs to utility companies when 
the QF sells all of its power to a utility company.44 State 
regulation includes regulation of the price that the QF can ask 
fi 't 45 or 1 s energy. 
A sale of energy by a state-regulated QF is known as a 
"PURPA sale.,,46 PURPA sales are by definition wholesale sales 
- that is, sales for resale - because PURPA explicitly denied 
FERC the authority to make rules that would authorize a QF 
to make a non-resale sale.47 Congress initiated PURPA sales to 
foster the development of renewable-energy generators by 
Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 
2000); Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Nondiscriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541 (May 10, 1996). 
38 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 533 F.3d at 822; see also Transmission Access Policy 
Study Group, 225 F.3d at 680-81; Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open 
Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 
21,541. 
39 Nat'l Ass'll of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 475 F.3d at 1282. 
4°Id. 
41 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 2601 et seq. (Westlaw 2009). 
42 A QF must (1) meet maximum-size criteria, (2) meet fuel-use criteria, and (3) 
file with FERC. 18 C.F.R. § 292.203 (Westlaw 2009). 
43 40 C.F.R. § 72.2 (Westlaw 2009) ("Qualifying facility (QF) means a 'qualifying 
small power production facility' within the meaning of [16 U.S.C. § 796](17)(C) ... or a 
'qualifying cogeneration facility' within the meaning of [16 U.S.C. § 796] (18)(B)"). 
44 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3 (Westlaw 2009); 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.303(c), 292.306(a) 
(Westlaw 2009). 
45 18 C.F.R. § 292.302(e)(1) (2009). 
46 Comments of the Transmission Access Policy Study Group, Docket No. RM05-
36-000 (2005), available at http://www.appanet.orgifileslPDFslAPPA_Cmts_RM05-
36_11-8-05%5Basfiled%5D.pdf; see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3 (Westlaw 2009). 
47 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3(a) (Westlaw 2009). 
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requiring public utility companies to buy energy from and sell 
energy to renewable-energy generators at a price that was 
determined by the states but bounded by FERC.48 PURPA 
sales are known as "avoided-cost"49 sales because, by statute, 
the price that a QF charges a public utility to buy the QF's 
energy cannot exceed the price that a public utility would pay 
to generate the energy itself.50 Furthermore, a rate can be 
lower than the avoided-cost amount only if such a rate (1) 
would "[b]e just and reasonable to the electric consumer," (2) 
would serve the interest of the public, and (3) would not 
discriminate against renewable facilities. 51 
3. The On-Site Exception 
FERC has declined to assert jurisdiction when a retail 
customer installs a generator that produces energy that is 
consumed where it is generated, known as "on-site" 
consumption.52 Jurisdiction in such an instance defaults to the 
state.53 FERC declines to assert jurisdiction even if the on-site 
generator participates in net metering, so long as the site never 
generates more than it consumes.54 "Net metering" permits a 
retail customer to send energy (created on the customer's own 
site using a generator such as a solar array) back to the public 
utility company to which the customer connects, effectively 
rewinding the customer's electric meter so that the customer 
only pays the public utility for a "net" amount of energy 
calculated as the amount consumed from the public utility 
minus the amount provided to the public utility. 55 This is 
significant because energy produced from a net-metered solar 
site can conceivably enter interstate commerce,56 and as 
48 Id. 
49 Conn. Light & Power Co., 71 F.E.RC. 'II 61,035, at 61,153 (1995) (noting that 
FERC concluded that states "may not impose rates that exceed avoided cost for sales by 
qualifying facilities ... at wholesale"). 
60 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3(b) (Westlaw 2009). 
51 18 C.F.R § 292.304(a) (Westlaw 2009). 
52 Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures 104 
F.E.R.C. 'II 61,103 at para. 805 (2003). 
53 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009). 
il4 See MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 F.E.RC. 'II 61,340, at 62,263 (2001) . 
.. 16 U.s.C.A. § 2621(d)(1l) (Westlaw 2009); see also Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 
2827.9(b)(4), 2827.10(a)(4) (Westlaw 2009). 
66 See MidAmerican Energy Co., 94 F.E.RC. 'II 61,340, at 62,262 (2001). 
8
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discussed, such a flow would otherwise justify FERC 
jurisdiction. 57 
III. FEED-IN TARIFFS: EFFECTIVE BUT UNSUPPORTABLE UNDER 
U.S. LAW 
The FIT is a measurably effective mechanism for 
promoting renewable energy, but a state's authority to 
implement this mechanism is painfully tenuous. This section 
first discusses the value of the FIT. Then, this section analyzes 
the case law that makes a state-implemented FIT so untenable. 
A. FEED-IN TARIFFS ARE A PROVEN METHOD FOR PROMOTING 
RENEWABLE-ENERGY GENERATION 
The FIT is a means of promoting renewable energy. The 
FIT is a mechanism for renewable-energy generators to sell 
power to a public utility at predefined terms and conditions, 
without contract negotiations.58 The FIT is a designated price 
(sometimes coupled with a designated purchase requirement) 
that a public utility company must pay whenever it buys 
energy from a renewable-energy producer. 59 The purpose of 
these tariffs is to encourage renewable-energy production 60 by 
guaranteeing that renewable-energy generators have 
connectivity to the grid and receive a price for their energy that 
makes their business profitable.6! FITs have the added 
advantage of stabilizing renewable-energy markets, thus 
lowering the risk to investors and, as a result, the cost of 
renewable energy.62 
FITs have been a proven success, and their 
., Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 458-69. 
" See Dr. Jan Hamrin, China's New Renewable Energy Law: The California 
Connection, 36 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 413, 430 n.4 (2006). 
59 See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.20(d) (Westlaw 2009); see also Feed-in 
Tariffs' Potential Role in US Renewable Power Development (Sept. 2, 2008), available 
at http://www.cera.com/aspx/cdalclientireport/reportpreview .aspx?CID=9707 &KID=9. 
'" See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 399.20(a) (Westlaw 2009); A.B. 1969, 2005-
2006 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (adding section 399.20 to the Public Utilities Code). 
61 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE STATE OF HAWAII, FEED-IN TARIFF 
CASE STUDIES: A WmTE PAPER IN SUPPORT OF THE HAWAII CLEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE 7 
(Sept. 2008), available at http://www.wind-
works.orglFeedLawslUSAlhawaii3eedin_tarifLcase_studies.pdf. 
62 Id. at 9. 
9
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implementation is spreading. In Germany, where FITs 
primarily originate, FITs have contributed to increasing the 
country's non-hydroelectric renewable-energy generation from 
about 1% of the country's generation in 1990 to about 14% in 
2007.63 Spain implemented FITs to successfully grow its wind-
generated renewable-energy sector and has now updated its 
laws to promote other segments of the renewable-energy 
market.64 FITs have also seen success in Portugal, France, 
Denmark, and Canada.65 In the United States, Florida,66 
Minnesota, Rhode Island, Michigan, Hawaii, Illinois, 
California, and Vermont have introduced FIT legislation.67 The 
success and continuing adoption of FITs indicate that, in the 
absence of a federal implementation, states must retain the 
regulatory authority to implement FITs in order to take 
advantage of this incentive for renewable-energy generation. 
B. STATE AsSERTIONS OF THE JURISDICTION NECESSARY TO 
IMPLEMENT FEED-IN TARIFFS WILL NOT SURVIVE A 
CHALLENGE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Jurisdictional conflicts make FITs generally unenforceable 
by any regulatory body other than FERC. Based on current 
federal law regarding jurisdiction over energy facilities, states 
lack the authority to implement FITs because FERC regulates 
the price of wholesale sales of electrical energy in interstate 
commerce.6B Under a FIT, a renewable-energy generator's sale 
is a sale at wholesale because the generator is selling the 
energy for subsequent resale. If that renewable-energy 
generator sells that energy in interstate commerce, then FERC 
jurisdiction applies and states lose the authority to designate 
63 Id. at 12. 
64 !d. at 14 . 
.. Id. at 15-23 (including an increased energy market in Portugal, a stronger 
photovoltaic industry in France, the highest percentage of renewable energy of any 
state in the European Union in Denmark, and a boost in wind and solar power in 
Canada). 
66 Gainesville, Fla., Ordinance 080566 (Feb. 5, 2009) available at 
http://www.gru.comlPdf/AboutGRUfNews/FIT/2009%20FIT%200rdinance%20CLEAN. 
pdf (introducing FIT legislation). 
67 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE STATE OF HAWAII, FEED-IN TARIFF 
CASE STUDIES: A WIllTE PAPER IN SUPPORT OF THE HAWAII CLEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE 
37-39, (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.wind-
works.orglFeedLawslUSAlhawaiiJeedin_tariff_case_studies.pdf. 
68 See 16 U.S.C.A. 824a-3(b) (Westlaw 2009). 
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FIT pricing, thus eliminating the FIT. Case law indicates that 
electrical energy from a renewable-energy generator is likely to 
be classified as participating in interstate commerce, thus 
subjecting the facility to FERC jurisdiction and rendering 
states incapable of enacting FITs.69 
1. Commingling Theory: FERC's Jurisdictional Sweep 
Case law establishes that FERC has jurisdiction over sales 
of energy from renewable generating facilities to in-state public 
utility companies. 70 The Supreme Court has held that when an 
entity generates electrical energy and that energy is 
transmitted - even indirectly - in interstate commerce, that 
entity is subject to the jurisdiction of the federal authority for 
energy regulation.71 This ruling remains good law.72 The 
reasoning, however, is out of date. FERC jurisdictional rules 
were largely established years before PURPA was written into 
law, and those pre-PURPA jurisdictional rules still apply, 
inhibiting modern FITs.73 
In Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light 
Co., the Supreme Court provided a sweeping grant of 
jurisdiction to federal regulators, but the grant was both 
avoidable and unnecessary. The controversy that led to this 
grant of jurisdiction centered upon Florida Power & Light Co. 
(FP&L), a public utility company.74 The Federal Power 
Commission, the predecessor of FERC, sought jurisdiction over 
FP&L.75 FP&L did not connect to any out-of-state utility 
company and so did not conduct any direct transmissions of 
electrical energy to out-of-state buyers.76 Such transmissions 
would certainly have subjected FP&L to federal regulation. 77 
However, FP&L was also a member of the Interconnected 
Systems Group (lSG), a national network of utilities that 
automatically provided power across state lines in 
69 See Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 471 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
70 See Id. at 454-55 (majority opinion). 
71 Id. at 455-56. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 455-57. 
75 Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 455. 
76 Id. at 456-57. 
77 Id. at 458. 
11
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emergencies.78 Federal regulators had evidence that FP&L 
sent power to an out-of-state utility through the ISG system79 
and could have used that evidence to justifY federal jurisdiction 
over FP&L.80 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court took a different 
approach. Though FP&L did not directly transmit energy to an 
out-of-state entity, FP&L did connect to the Florida Power 
Corporation.81 The Florida Power Corporation connected to a 
utility company in Georgia82 and regularly exchanged power 
with that company.83 The Court accepted the Federal Power 
Commission's theory that FP&L energy commingled with 
Florida Power Corporation energy and as a result was probably 
transmitted to Georgia, thus subjecting FP&L to federal 
jurisdiction.84 
FP&L connected to the Florida Power Corporation over a 
three-strand power line, called a "bus."85 The Federal Power 
Commission contended that the bus acted as a reservoir where 
energy commingled.86 FP&L countered that a bus was not a 
pool of energy where electrons commingle, but rather a line 
that receives and loses energy at discrete, identifiable points. 87 
FP&L contended that the nature of the line established that 
power from FP&L would be drawn off the line without ever 
crossing to Georgia.S8 The Court, however, accepted the 
commingling theory of the Federal Power Commission's expert 
- even though the expert admitted that commingling was not 
established as scientific face9 - by determining that expert 
testimony may qualifY as substantial evidence.9o Substantial 
evidence is conclusive in the judicial review of a FERC order,91 
and the Court expressly declined to apply a standard of 
78Id. at 457. 
79Id. 
80 See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61, 70 (1943). 
81 Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 456-57. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 457 . 
.. Id. at 461-69. 
85 Id. at 462. 
88 Id. at 462-63. 
87 Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 462. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 464 n.13. 
90 Id. at 462-68. 
91 16 U.S.C.A. § 825.{b) (Westlaw 2009). 
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scientific certainty.92 This interpretation by the Supreme Court 
of the substantial-evidence standard gave the Federal Power 
Commission a much greater likelihood of establishing 
jurisdiction over a facility, because theory would suffice where 
proof had not been obtained. 
The dissenting Justices in Florida Power & Light 
presciently noted the ramifications of the majority's decision.93 
Keeping in mind that any interstate transmission of power, no 
matter how small, is sufficient for federal jurisdiction to 
attach,94 the dissenting Justices noted that every non-isolated 
energy facility is subject to federal jurisdiction.95 The Supreme 
Court effectively reversed the burden of proof in jurisdictional 
conflicts. Instead of requiring federal regulators to prove that 
a generator's energy actually flows in interstate commerce, 
regulators can assume the hypothetical flow based on 
commingling theory. As a result, power providers shoulder the 
burden of proving that their energy does not cross state lines. 
Under such a scheme, FERC effectively holds jurisdiction over 
any sale of energy at wholesale unless the generating facility 
can demonstrate that its power does not enter interstate 
commerce. Thus, states can only regulate the rates of 
renewable-energy generators that demonstrably avoid 
interstate transmission; therefore, states can apply FITs only 
to such facilities. 
2. Feed-In Tariffs Win a Battle but Lose the War: The 
Consequences of Consolidated Edison 
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
FITs won a state battle but lost a federal war. In 1984, the 
New York Court of Appeals examined whether PURPA 
preempted states from requiring electric utilities to purchase 
power from federal qualifying facilities at rates in excess of the 
PURPA avoided-cost limit. 96 The New York Court of Appeals 
held that PURPA permitted states to exceed PURPA limits, 
92 Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 467. 
93 Id. at 470-71 (Douglas, J., dissenting,joined by Burger, C.J.). 
94 See id. at 461 n.10 (majority opinion) . 
.. Id. at 470-71 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
96 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 63 N.Y.2d 424 (1984), 
appeal dismissed, 470 U.S. 1075 (1985). 
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and this ruling remains the law in New York State.97 
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court denied review 
due to lack of a federal question, and FERC directly repudiated 
the position of the New York Court of Appeals by changing the 
regulatory language upon which New York's highest court 
based its decision. 98 
In Consolidated Edison, the state of New York passed a 
law requiring all utility companies to purchase energy from 
state qualifying facilities at a rate of not less than six cents per 
kW-hour, even though such a rate exceeded the avoided cost of 
the state utility companies.99 Often, generators that qualified 
as state qualifYing facilities also qualified as federal qualifYing 
facilities under the FPA and, as a result, state law forced 
utility companies to pay more than avoided-cost rates to federal 
qualifYing facilities. 100 Consolidated Edison, a public utility 
company, argued that New York's law was preempted by 
PURPA.lOl The New York Court of Appeals held that PURPA's 
avoided-cost rate provided a ceiling to rate-setting by federal 
regulations, but it did not prevent state law from increasing 
rates to further promote renewable energy.l02 The New York 
Court of Appeals based its decision on PURPA's legislative 
history and, more solidly, on the Preamble to FERC Rules. l03 
The Preamble, from 1980, notes that "[s]tates are free, under 
their own authority, to enact laws or regulations providing for 
rates which would result in even greater encouragement of 
[renewable energy] technologies.,,104 
The ruling was a valiant attempt on the part of the New 
York Court of Appeals to encourage states to promote 
alternative energy, but it was a strategy doomed to failure on a 
national scale. FERC has authority over wholesale sales of 
electrical energy in interstate commerce. 105 PURPA gave FERC 
the power to delegate ratemaking authority to states, but 
FERC applied an avoided-cost cap to that rate making 
97 Id. at 433. 
98 Conn. Light & Power Co., 71 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,035, at 61,052-53 (1995). 
99 Consolo Edison Co. ofN Y., 63 N.Y.2d at 435 n.6. 
100 Id. at 432, 435 n.6. 
101 Id. at 433. 
102 Id. at 435-36. 
IOJ Id. at 436. 
104 Id. at 436 n.8. 
lOS 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(b)(1), (d) (Westlaw 2009). 
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authority. lOS Neither PURPA nor FERC's regulations give 
states the authority to exceed FERC's avoided-cost cap on 
federal qualifying-facility rates. The New York Court of 
Appeals took advantage of the Preamble to FERC's regulation, 
but FERC took note and subsequently explained that FERC 
regulations and PURPA do not permit federal qualifying-
facility rates, at wholesale, in excess of avoided cost.107 Federal 
regulators then removed from the Preamble the language on 
which the New York Court of Appeals relied. lOS Today, 
Consolidated Edison continues to permit New York regulators 
to exceed PURPA's avoided-cost cap on federal qualifying-
facility pricing, but the justification for the ruling in 
Consolidated Edison has vanished. 
Consolidated Edison did not reach the Supreme Court, and 
subsequently the legal justification for the decision of the New 
York Court of Appeals has diminished, leaving states that 
followed New York's example in a precarious legal situation. 
The parties to Consolidated Edison sought Supreme Court 
review of the New York Court of Appeals' decision, and the 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of a federal 
question. lo9 In a thoughtful dissent to the majority's dismissal, 
Justice White noted that state courts oflast resort had reached 
conflicting decisions regarding state power under PURPA. l1O 
Some states other than New York had authorized rates that 
exceeded avoided costs, and other states had enforced avoided-
cost limits. 111 This issue remains undecided by the Supreme 
Court even now as states have begun to implement FITs. More 
importantly, the strongest basis for the decision of the New 
York Court of Appeals - the statement in FERC's Preamble -
has evaporated since the parties of Consolidated Edison sought 
review. 112 As a result, the issue remains open for Supreme 
Court review, but states lack a practicable argument for 
asserting jurisdiction. 
106 16 U.S.C.A. § 824a-3(b) (Westlaw 2009). 
107 71 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,035, at 61,153 (1995). 
108 Id. 
109 Conso!. Edison Co. ofN.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 470 U.S. 1075 (1985). 
l1°Id. at 1077-78 (White, J., dissenting). 
111 Id. 
112 71 F.E.R.C. 'II 61,035, at 61,153 (1995). 
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IV. THE SOLUTION: A FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE CARVE-OUT 
GRANTING JURISDICTION OVER RENEW ABLE-ENERGY 
RESOURCES TO THE STATES 
To permit states to enforce FITs without the fear of federal 
preemption, Congress must grant jurisdiction over renewable-
energy generators to the states. Neither the concept of state 
regulation of interstate energy transactions nor the idea of the 
FIT is alien to Congress. This section discusses a prior 
instance of state authority over electrical energy in interstate 
commerce that can serve as a model for a FIT carve-out. This 
section also addresses the potential for and ramifications of a 
federal FIT as a next step in the evolution of energy regulation 
in the United States, but notes that a failure to protect existing 
and potential state FITs in the meantime is a needless and 
counterproductive risk. 
A. THE PRECURSOR TO A CARVE-OUT FOR FEED-IN TARIFFS 
State jurisdiction over the wholesale sale of electrical 
energy in interstate commerce is not unprecedented. The 
wholesale rates charged by rural power cooperatives, as 
permitted under the Rural Electrification Act (REA) in order to 
bring electricity to rural regions, are not subject to federal 
regulation. 113 Federal regulators (at the time, the Federal 
Power Commission, the predecessor to FERC) determined that 
they had no jurisdiction over the wholesale sale of electrical 
energy in interstate commerce when that energy was generated 
by facilities that were subject to the authority of the Rural 
Electrification Administration 114 under the REA. 115 Federal 
regulators concluded that cooperatives operating under the 
REA qualified as instrumentalities of the United States1l6 and 
thus were exempt from the FPA, which was intended to 
regulate private, for-profit enterprises. 1I7 
113 See In re Dairyland Power Coop., 37 F.P.C. 12 (1967). 
11. Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1983). 
115 7 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq. (Westlaw 2009). 
116 In re Dairyland Power Coop., 37 F.P.C. at 17 n.6 (citing the exception in the 
FPA). 
117 Id. at 15-16 ("The purpose of [the FPA) was most clear: it was designed to 
prevent the notorious investment and profit abuses which had developed in the 
industry under the domination of the holding companies .... We think that [the 
exemption provided by FPA § 201(0) obviously discloses a congressional intent to 
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In the absence of federal authority, state jurisdiction 
applied. llS In Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas 
Public Services Commission, the Supreme Court determined 
that when federal regulators lacked jurisdiction over 
electricity-generating facilities, state regulators could assert 
jurisdiction over those facilities - and thus designate rates for 
those facilities - even though the facilities connected to an 
interstate grid and therefore ostensibly participated in 
interstate commerce.1l9 The facilities in controversy when the 
Supreme Court made its ruling were run by the Arkansas 
Electric Cooperative Corporation (AECC), a rural power 
cooperative. 120 Though the AECC connected to the interstate 
grid, its basic operation consisted of supplying power from in-
state generating facilities to in-state member cooperatives.121 
Those cooperatives then sold the power to consumers.122 
Because the AECC sold energy for resale, its sales were 
wholesale sales. 123 Because the AECC connected to the 
interstate grid, its sales took place in interstate commerce.124 
Such sales would normally be subject to federal regulation. 125 
However, REA facilities such as the AECC were exempt from 
federal energy regulation. 126 The Rural Electrification 
Administration lacked power over in-state electricity rates, so 
it could not regulate the AECC's in-state sales to member 
cooperatives. 127 With neither federal regulators nor the Rural 
Electrification Administration able to regulate the rates of 
AECC's sales to member cooperatives, states held rate-making 
authority over the facilities even though the facilities 
conducted wholesale sales of electrical energy in interstate 
subject private enterprise alone to regulation by [federal regulators)." (citing In re Neb. 
Power Co., 5 F.P.C. 8, 19 (1946))). 
HE See Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 377, 381-82. 
H9 [d. at 381. 
120 [d. at 380-81. 
121 [d. at 394. 
122 [d. at 381. 
123 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(d) (Westlaw 2009). 
124 See Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 470-71 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
125 [d.; see also Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 381 ("If AECC were not a rural 
power cooperative, the wholesale rates it charges to its members would ... be subject 
exclusively to federal regulation."). 
126 Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 381-82. 
127 In re Dairyland Power Coop., 37 F.P.C. 12 (1967) (noting that the Rural 
Electrification Administrator was "absolutely without power in the matter of fIxing 
rates within the boundaries of a state"). 
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commerce. 128 
In addition to determining jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
also noted that state regulation of energy in interstate 
commerce did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clausel29 
unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce was clearly 
excessive in relation to the local benefits of the regulation.130 
This is crucial because the Dormant Commerce Clause can 
prevent a state from regulating aspects of interstate 
commerce. 131 Because precedent has established that 
generators connected to a grid participate in interstate 
commerce,132 the Supreme Court had to evaluate whether 
Arkansas' regulation of rates of electrical energy wholesale 
sales in interstate commerce violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause. 133 The Court reasoned that such regulation did not 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because the regulation 
did not qualify as economic protectionism since the regulation 
did not bolster the state's economic interest at the expense of 
other states, and because regulating electricity is a legitimate 
local public interest. 134 
The Supreme Court's determination that states could 
regulate the energy rates of cooperatives in the absence of 
federal regulation without violating the dormant Commerce 
Clause would be equally applicable to the analogous 
circumstances of renewable-energy generators. Yes, such 
generators would be connected to the interstate grid, and thus 
under accepted reasoning they would be sending power into 
interstate commerce. Fundamentally, though, they would be 
selling the power that they generate to in-state public utility 
128 Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 377, 381-82. 
129 The Dormant Commerce Clause is the principle that state and local laws are 
unconstitutional if they place an undue burden on interstate commerce. See Pike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
130 Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 393-94. 
131 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 178 ("Where the statute regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are 
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." (citing Huron Cement Co. v. 
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960))). 
132 See Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. at 470-71 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
133 Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 389 ("Even in the absence of congressional 
legislation, 'the Commerce Clause contains an implied limitation on the power of the 
States to interfere with or impose burdens on interstate commerce.'" (quoting Western 
& Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652 (1981»). 
134 Id. at 394. 
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compames, just the AECC sold primarily to in-state 
cooperatives. As with the AECC, the Dormant Commerce 
Clause would be no barrier to state regulation because energy 
regulation is a legitimate local interest. Furthermore, the 
implementation of a FIT does not qualify as economic 
protectionism because a FIT does not bolster one state's 
economic interests at the expense of one or more other states. 
The state, then, could regulate the renewable-energy 
generators' in-state rates just as Arkansas was able to regulate 
the AECC's in-state rates. All that states require is 
congressional permission. Congress created the REA "to 
establish a permanent and comprehensive national policy for 
rural electrification.,,135 The REA effectively revoked federal 
jurisdiction over the in-state sale and transmission of electrical 
energy generated by select facilities, thereby granting 
regulatory authority to the states.136 Congress must now enact 
a similar carve-out of federal jurisdiction in order to authorize 
states to implement FITs to promote renewable energy 
generation. 
B. LOOKING FORWARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A FEDERAL 
FEED-IN TARIFF 
This carve-out solution, however, is not without problems 
of its own. Among other choices, the United States must 
choose whether a federally mandated FIT is superior to various 
state implementations. FITs have already been proposed on 
the federal level in the form of the Renewable Energy Jobs and 
Security Act. 137 This proposed legislation would have 
implemented FITs, but would have granted rate-making 
authority to FERC instead of the states.13B However, this 
legislation failed to reach a vote in the llOth Congress and has 
not been reintroduced. 139 As a result, state-instituted FITs 
have not been preempted by a federal FIT, but neither have 
state-instituted FITs been authorized by Congress. State-
mandated FITs remain at risk of a jurisdictional challenge and 
135 In re Dairyland Power Coop., 37 F.P.C. at 19. 
136 See Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp., 461 U.S. at 398-99. 
131 Renewable Energy Jobs and Security Act, H.R. 6401, 110th Congo (2008). 
138 Id. 
139 See H.R. 6401: Renewable Energy Jobs and Security Act, 
http://www.govtrack.us!congresslbill.xpd?bill=h110-6401 (last visited Nov. 18,2009). 
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thus still require protection in the form of a jurisdictional 
carve-out until such time as a more effective means of 
promoting renewable energy emerges. 
As that time approaches, this proposed carve-out rule must 
necessarily evolve. However, existing jurisdictional law has 
not evolved with renewable-energy technology, and a bright-
line rule granting jurisdiction to states will help the law catch 
up with reality for the present. That this rule may later give 
way to another, better rule is only appropriate as the 
renewable-energy industry develops. In fact, evolution is a 
cornerstone of successful FITs around the world. 140 
v. CONCLUSION 
Congress has the opportunity to clear the path for the 
state-implemented FIT, a renewable-energy solution that has a 
demonstrated record of success. To succeed, FITs must 
overcome the obstacle of outdated law. Congress can eliminate 
this obstacle by creating an exception to federal jurisdiction 
akin to the exception that Congress created by passing the 
REA. A jurisdictional carve-out for the states would recreate a 
familiar jurisdictional scheme and would implement a time-
tested mechanism for promoting renewable energy. Such a 
carve-out need not be permanent, but it would be a useful and 
productive next step to increase the adoption of renewable-
energy generation in the United States. 
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